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In Brief
Cells in the cingulate cortex of primates
are able to predict the unknown
intentions or state of mind of other
individuals and are critically important in
enacting cooperative social behavior, a
framework that might be relevant for
understanding interpersonal, economic,
and political decision-making processes
in humans.
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A cornerstone of successful social interchange is
the ability to anticipate each other’s intentions or ac-
tions. While generating these internal predictions is
essential for constructive social behavior, their single
neuronal basis and causal underpinnings are un-
known. Here, we discover specific neurons in the pri-
mate dorsal anterior cingulate that selectively predict
an opponent’s yet unknown decision to invest in their
common good or defect and distinct neurons that
encode the monkey’s own current decision based
on prior outcomes. Mixed population predictions of
the other was remarkably near optimal compared to
behavioral decoders. Moreover, disrupting cingulate
activity selectively biased mutually beneficial inter-
actions between the monkeys but, surprisingly, had
no influence on their decisions when no net-positive
outcome was possible. These findings identify a
group of other-predictive neurons in the primate
anterior cingulate essential for enacting cooperative
interactions andmay pave a way toward the targeted
treatment of social behavioral disorders.
INTRODUCTION
Social interactions are unique from other behaviors in that they
inherently require individuals to anticipate each other’s unknown
intentions and actions. Accordingly, individuals need to consider
not only how their decisions affect their own personal outcomes
but also how theymay affect the outcomes of other individuals in
a group and how these individuals may consequently respond.
Such interactions, therefore, are not simply governed by
the learned sensorimotor contingencies between action and
outcome but are rather based on the ability to predict the un-
known intentions or ‘‘state of mind’’ of others.
Whether and what neurons encode another’s unknown ac-
tions and what role these signals play during joint decisions,
made independently by two interacting individuals, remain un-
known. Prior studies have demonstrated that frontal canonical
cells, termed mirror neurons, encode another’s known, observ-
able actions, as well as actions performed by the individual him-
self (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010).
More recently, neurons have been similarly found to encode an-other’s observed receipt of reward (Azzi et al., 2012; Chang et al.,
2013; Hosokawa and Watanabe, 2012), as well as monitoring of
other’s errors (Yoshida et al., 2012, see Discussion). These find-
ings have therefore provided a critical understanding of how an-
other’s known and observable actionsmay be represented at the
neuronal level. However, they are distinct from those that may
represent another’s imminent decisions or intentions, which
are fundamentally unobservable and unknown. While cells that
predict another’s unobservable intended actions have been
widely hypothesized, and are a cornerstone of many theories
on animal social behavior (Frith and Frith, 1999; Gallese and
Goldman, 1998; Rilling et al., 2004; Sanfey et al., 2006; Vogeley
et al., 2001), their existence has never been demonstrated.
A second unresolved question is how putative neural signals
related to self and other’s decisions may affect achieving mutual
goals. Mutually beneficial interactions are ubiquitous among so-
cial animals (Bshary et al., 2008; Clutton-Brock, 2009; de Waal,
2000; Stephens et al., 2002; Warneken and Tomasello, 2006)
and are cardinal to our understanding of socially-guided deci-
sions. While competitive interactions, which allow an individual
to profit at the expense of the other, have been previously inves-
tigated (Donahue et al., 2013; Hosokawa and Watanabe, 2012;
Lee et al., 2005; Seo et al., 2014), the single-neuronal basis of
mutually beneficial interactions, favorable to both individuals,
have not been explored.
Finally, whereas certain areas may harbor signals that encode
elements of social decision-making (Abe and Lee, 2011; Apps
et al., 2012; Apps and Ramnani, 2014; Azzi et al., 2012; Behrens
et al., 2008; Carter et al., 2012; Chang et al., 2013; Delgado et al.,
2005; Donahue et al., 2013; Hampton et al., 2008; Lee et al.,
2005; Rilling et al., 2002; Rudebeck et al., 2006; Sanfey
et al., 2003; Tomlin et al., 2006; Yoshida et al., 2012), it has not
yet been determined what causal contribution neurons in these
areas may play in modulating mutual decisions.
A formal framework for studying mutually beneficial joint deci-
sions is by the iterated prisoner’s-dilemma (iPD) game (Clutton-
Brock, 2009; Rilling et al., 2002; Stephens et al., 2002). This task
incorporates two crucial properties: one is that the outcome is
contingent upon themutual concurrent decisions of both individ-
uals, and therefore no one decision guarantees an individual’s
outcome, and the other is that both decisions can be either
concordant or discordant (Camerer, 2003). Therefore, the key
to succeeding in the game relies on one’s ability to anticipate
the other’s concurrent, yet unknown intentions. Moreover, this
dissociation of self and other decisions, concordant and discor-
dant interactions, and the dissociation between one’s decisionCell 160, 1233–1245, March 12, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1233
Figure 1. Task Design
(A) Experimental set-up. The monkeys sat side-by-side, facing a screen. On each trial, they covertly chose, in succession, to cooperate (orange hexagon) or
defect (blue triangle). Following delay, both choices were revealed on screen and reward was delivered.
(B) Payoff matrix. Reward outcome for all possible choice combinations. Cooperation and defection were defined operationally by whether mutual benefit or loss
is incurred.
(C) Trial timeline. The order in which the monkeys made their selections was randomized on each trial.and reward, allows one to identify neuronal signals within the
population that specifically encode another’s yet unknown deci-
sions and importantly dissociate them from those that reflect
one’s own planned decision and expected reward.
Here, we used a joint-decision paradigm to study mutual deci-
sions in primates and provide evidence of neurons that predict
another agent’s intentions and modes of cooperation. We spe-
cifically focused on the dorsal region of the anterior cingulate
cortex (dACC) because of its broad connectivity with frontal
and temporal-parietal areas known to be involved in interactive
behavior (Behrens et al., 2009; Paus, 2001) as well as its role in
encoding social interest in other individuals based on functional
imaging (Behrens et al., 2008) and ablative studies (Rudebeck
et al., 2006).We find that many dACCneurons encoded themon-
key’s own decision to cooperate. Furthermore, a substantial and
largely distinct group of neurons encoded the opponent mon-
key’s decisions when they were yet unknown. These other-
predictive neurons were uniquely sensitive to social context
compared to other population cells and encoded no information
about the monkey’s own decisions or expected reward. At the
population-level, dACC neurons reliably predicted the other’s
decisions with accuracy that remarkably approached those of
behavioral decoders when based on prior selections. Finally,
transient disruption of dACC activity directly and specifically in-
hibited mutually beneficial interactions based on prior decisions,
but did not affect other decisions based on receipt of reward.
These findings together provide direct examination of how in-
dividual neurons represent another’s unknown intentions or1234 Cell 160, 1233–1245, March 12, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.covert ‘‘state of mind,’’ demonstrate the distinct encoding of
other decisions from self-decisions and reward, ascertain the
distinct roles that self- and other-encoding cells play in enacting
joint decisions between simultaneously interacting animals, and
demonstrate a causal link between cingulate activity and the
specific enactment of mutually beneficial decisions.
RESULTS
Increased Cooperation following Mutual Cooperation
Four pairs of adult male Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) per-
formed an iPD game whereby each animal chose on each trial
between two response options over multiple successive trials
(Figure 1A). The choice terms, cooperation and defection, were
derived from iPD literature (Camerer, 2003). These were defined
operationally by the payoff matrix illustrated in Figure 1B and are
not referred to here in an anthropomorphic way. If both animals
selected cooperation, both received the highest mutual reward
whereas if one of the animals defected, that animal received
the highest individual reward. The lynchpin of this game, how-
ever, was that if neither monkey cooperated, they would both
receive a lower reward than if they both chose to cooperate.
Accordingly, each individual decision could result in either high
or low reward depending on the other’s choice, and reward
could not be predicted solely from any individual decision. More-
over, since the monkeys performed multiple trials, the decision
of an individual to cooperate or defect on one trial may influence
the other’s subsequent decisions and, therefore, affect the future
Figure 2. Mutually Beneficial Interactions
Increase Cooperation
(A) Conditional probability of a monkey cooperat-
ing given that it cooperated or defected on the
preceding trial (left) and conditional probability of a
monkey cooperating given the opponent cooper-
ated or defected on the preceding trial (right). Error
bars represent SEM.
(B) Probability of selecting cooperation following
both monkey’s prior mutual selections. Red bar
denotes overall cooperation probability. Mutually
beneficial interactions led to an increase in sub-
sequent cooperation (this was not evident when
playing a computer opponent or in separate
rooms, see text).
(C) Probability of following tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy.
Histogramshowsprobability for5,000controlMonte
Carlo realizations of surrogate behavioral data.
Red dashed line indicates experimental data value.
(D) Probability of following win-stay-lose-switch
(WSLS) strategy. Red dashed line indicates
experimental data value. Inset denotes observed
data values of both strategies (blue bars), error
bars represent SEM, white bars denote mean of
surrogate control values.
See also Figure S1.potential for mutual benefit. Here, we used this setup to differen-
tiate between potential neuronal signals that encoded self-deci-
sions, other-decisions, and expected reward as both monkeys
jointly, simultaneously made their own choices.
The monkeys sat side-by-side, facing a screen that displayed
different targets representing the choice to cooperate or defect
(note, that facial expression observations or eye contact were
not possible here by design). Neithermonkey saw the othermon-
key’s selection until after they made their own selection plus
an additional blank screen delay. Then both selections were
revealed on-screen followed by reward (Figure 1C). To further
rule out implicit signals such as auditory cues that may
contribute to predictions of the other’s decisions, we randomly
alternated the order in which monkeys made their selections
(see below).
Behaviorally, we find that the monkeys were more likely to
select defection over cooperation. The monkeys performed
1,346 trials over seven sessions; they chose defection in
65.3% of trials and cooperation in 34.7% of trials (chi-square =
123.7, df = 1, p < 1029). They selected cooperation simulta-
neously on 17.1% of trials, significantly higher than chance level
(chi-square = 44.07, df = 1, p < 1011) and both defected on
37.6% of trials, significantly less than chance level (chi-square =
22.27, df = 1, p < 106). Similar to prior observations in humans
(Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965),
the monkeys were less likely to cooperate if the other previously
defected (26% ± 6%; 23 2-chi-square = 56.89, df = 1, p < 1013)
(Figure 2A), indicating their understanding of the task by taking
into account the other’s past action when selecting their own.
Moreover, the monkeys were most likely to cooperate if both
monkeys cooperated on the preceding trial (62.1% ± 7.0%;
chi-square = 76.7, df = 1, p < 1018) (Figure 2B), despite the
fact that individual reward is maximized if a monkey defects
when his opponent continues cooperating (note these choicesdid not reflect a simple tit-for-tat response; see Supplemental
Information and Figure S1). In other words, the monkeys recipro-
cated mutual cooperation for continued mutual benefit. Finally,
we examined the behavioral strategy followed by the monkeys
by analyzing specific choice sequences and found that they
were significantly different than chance (Figures 2C and 2D;
see Supplemental Information).
Behavioral Controls
To determine whether the monkeys’ choices were affected
by social context, i.e., their interaction with another monkey,
we repeated the task in the exact same set-up, only now replac-
ing a monkey with a computer opponent (Chang et al., 2013;
Hosokawa and Watanabe, 2012). The computer’s choices
were determined by the statistics of monkeys’ choices on the
previous sessions, described above (see Supplemental Informa-
tion). We find that the monkeys were less likely to cooperate
overall (19.1% ± 3.9% versus 34.7%; chi-square = 161.73,
df = 1, p < 1036). Moreover, they were less likely to reciprocate
cooperation followingmutual cooperation (14.5% ± 3.0% versus
62.1%; chi-square = 73.25, df = 1, p < 1017) when playing a
computer opponent, therefore leading to less mutually beneficial
interactions.
To eliminate the possibility that the reduced cooperation
resulted from differences in choice selection between the com-
puter model and the behaving monkey, we performed an addi-
tional set of social control experiments. Here, the monkeys
were placed in two separate rooms so that they could not see
the other player or hear each other’s licking sounds. In addition,
the monkeys’ juicers were placed outside the experiment room
to eliminate any cues from juicer clicks. Under these conditions,
themonkeys performed the same task as before with each other.
The monkeys performed a total of 2,344 trials in five experi-
mental sessions. By and large, we find the behavior of theCell 160, 1233–1245, March 12, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1235
monkeys in this control to be similar to the behavior found in the
computer opponent control. Namely, the overall probability of
the monkeys to cooperate under these conditions significantly
dropped to 14.2%, compared with 34.7%when playing together
(chi-square = 432.08, df = 1, p < 1095). Furthermore, we did not
observe the increased cooperation followingmutual cooperation
that was a signature of themonkeys’ behavior when playing each
other in the same room. Namely, the probability of cooperating
following amutual cooperation trial dropped to 17.4%compared
with 62% when playing in the same room (chi-square = 38.76,
df = 1, p < 109). This value closely matches the computer con-
trol value of 14.5% (not significant [n.s.] difference). Therefore,
the effect of social context on the behavior of the monkeys is
corroborated by these two independent control experiments
(i.e., computer control and other room control).
As noted above, themonkeys demonstrated their understand-
ing of the task by taking into account past joint decisions when
selecting their own. However, to further confirm that the mon-
keys understood the relationship between their choices and
payoff, the monkeys performed an additional control version of
the task in which they were presented with the same choices
as before, but could now see the other’s selection before re-
sponding (see Supplemental Information). We find that, on trials
in which the other monkey first defected, the monkey maximized
reward by subsequently selecting defection on 90.7% ± 2.2% of
trials (i.e., within the same trial when no mutual beneficial
outcome was possible). This held true even if the other monkey
cooperated on the preceding trial (95.0% ± 3.0%). In other
words, the monkeys did not reciprocate a prior offer of cooper-
ation if they knew their opponent defected on the present trial.
This did not reflect a simple reward maximization behavior (see
Supplemental Information).
Single Neuronal Encoding of Another Individual’s
Unknown Decisions
We recorded 363 neurons in the dACC in two of the four mon-
keys during task performance. Of these, 185 neurons signifi-
cantly responded to the task (stepwise linear regression of
neuronal firing rate with both monkeys’ current and past deci-
sions as predictor variables, corrected for comparisons across
pre- and post-selection periods) (Figures 3A–3D and S2; Table
S1; Experimental Procedures; Supplemental Information). In to-
tal, 24.3% of neurons encoded themonkey’s own choices on the
current trial; 15.7% responded differentially to choosing cooper-
ation versus defection during the pre-selection period (immedi-
ately before the monkey’s selection) while 11.4% responded
differentially during the post-selection period (immediately after
the monkey’s selection; p < 0.05) (Figure 3A). There was a
2.33-fold ± 0.26-fold change in absolute activity between coop-
eration and defection when considered across all such neurons
(p < 0.05). While the sign of the modulation of neural activity was
similar in most neurons when the monkeys chose to defect, re-
sponses were more variable across neurons when the monkeys
chose cooperation. Approximately half of these neurons (54.7%)
had an increase of activity whereas the other half presented a
decrease in activity (Figure 3C, left panel). In other words,
many dACC neurons encoded the monkey’s decision to coop-
erate or defect.1236 Cell 160, 1233–1245, March 12, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.The key for succeeding in this game was the ability to antici-
pate the other monkey’s concurrent decisions. Analyzing neural
activity during the time when monkeys were still unaware of the
other’s concurrent selection, we found that the activity of many
neurons was modulated by the other monkey’s yet unknown up-
coming choice. A total of 32.4% of neurons demonstrated signif-
icant differences in activity when the other monkey concurrently
selected cooperation versus defection. Most of these (27.6%)
encoded the opponent’s unknown choice during the post-selec-
tion period (but prior to being informed of the other’s response)
and 7% during pre-selection period (p < 0.05) (Figure 3B). There
was a 1.81-fold ± 0.07-fold change in absolute activity between
other’s cooperation and defection when considered across all
such neurons (p < 0.05) (Figure 3C, right panel; note that the total
number of neurons encoding current decisions was larger when
considering past responses; see Supplemental Information and
further below).
Neurons encoding the opponent monkey’s choices and neu-
rons encoding the monkey’s own choices demonstrated little
overlap with each other (Figure 3D). Only 4.3% of neurons
responded to both the monkey’s own decisions as well as the
opponent’s planned decisions. This was significantly lower
than chance level, i.e., that expected by a product of the individ-
ual probabilities of encoding self and other (expected: 7.9%,
chi-square = 4.97, df = 1, p < 0.026). This suggests that self
and other related computations were carried out by largely
distinct neuronal populations (Figures S3 and S4; Supplemental
Information).
To further delineate and confirm the response characteristics
of these neurons, we applied three additional approaches to
re-analyze the data. First, we performed a choice probability
(CP) index analysis examining the trial-by-trial encoding of single
neuronal responses. CP index analysis results closely matched
the stepwise regression results (35.7% of task responsive neu-
rons had a significant CP index for encoding the other’s choice
post-selection, and 21.6% had a significant CP index for
encoding self-decision pre-selection) (Figures 3E and S5A;
Supplemental Information). Second, we performed an Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) analysis, which penalizes models
containingmultiple terms, to complement the term selection pro-
cess in the stepwise linear regression (Figures S5B–S5E; Tables
S2A and S2B). Finally, we performed an unsupervised popula-
tion analysis in the form of a mixture of linear regression models
to test in amore unbiased fashion the behavioral factors to which
neurons responded at the population level (Figures S6A–S6F).
These analyses confirmed the existence of self and other encod-
ing neurons and the prominence of other-predictive neurons in
the dACC and further demonstrate that our findings based on
the neuronal data were reproducible across statistical methods
(see Supplemental Information).
Neurons Predicting the Other’s Unknown Decision Are
Sensitive to Social Context
To test the direct effect of social context on neural encoding, we
recorded a total of 164 additional neurons from the dACC during
the social control experiment in which the monkeys played
together but in separate rooms. Of these, 84 neurons were found
task-responsive using the same stepwise regression analysis as
Figure 3. Distinct dACC Neurons Encode Self and Other’s Decisions
Peristimulus histograms as mean firing activity ± SEM and raster plots for individual neurons. Cooperation trials are denoted in red and defection in blue. Time
zero denotes monkey’s own selection.
(A) Left: an example of a neuron that encoded the monkey’s own current decision to cooperate or defect. Right: the same neuron did not encode the opponent’s
yet unknown decision. Gray bar indicates the time when both decisions were revealed to the monkeys (on half of trials; see text).
(B) Example of a neuron that encoded the opponent monkey’s yet unknown decision to cooperate or defect (right), but did not encode the monkey’s own current
decision (left).
(C) Population responses based on the monkey’s own current decisions for neurons that had a significantly higher activity during self-cooperation versus self-
defection (top left) and significantly lower activity during self-cooperation versus self-defection (bottom left); and population responses for neurons that had
significantly higher activity during other-cooperation versus other-defection (top right) and significantly lower activity during other-cooperation versus other-
defection (bottom right).
(D) Functional partitioning within the population between neurons encoding themonkey’s own current decisions and the opponent’s yet unknown decisions. Log-
log-scale scatter plots of individual neurons p values obtained from the regression analysis during pre- (left) and post-selection (right) periods (only significant
neurons are shown). Dashed lines denote significance thresholds. Gray points denote neurons that significantly encoded both the monkey’s own decisions and
the opponent’s decisions.
(E) Neurons with significant modulation based on choice probability (CP) analysis. Top row: pre-decision time period, bottom row: post-decision time period.
Columns from left to right correspond to different behavioral variables (SC, self-current; SP, self-past; OC, other-current; OP, other-past). Red bars indicate
significant neurons as obtained by bootstrap estimate.
See also Figures S2, S3, S4, S5, and S6 and Tables S1, S2A, S2B, and S3.above (p < 0.025 for any main or interaction effect, either during
the pre or post selection period; see Table S3). We found that
only 14.3% of task responsive cells predicted the other’s choice,significantly less than the 27.6% observed in the main task (chi-
square = 7.42, df = 1, p < 0.006; post-decision). In contrast, a
significantly larger fraction of task-responsive neurons encodedCell 160, 1233–1245, March 12, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1237
the monkey’s own decision in the separate room control (21.4%
during the pre-selection period and 26.2% during the post-
selection period, compared to 15.7% and 11.4% respectively
in the main task; pre-selection: chi-square = 2.083, df = 1,
p = 0.149; post-selection: chi-square = 18.193, df = 1, p <
0.00002). One possible explanation for the higher number of neu-
rons encoding the monkey’s own decisions is that there were
more trials recorded per session during the separate room con-
trol. However, if this was the only factor, we would also expect to
have a concurrent increase in the number of other-predictive
neurons, which was not the case. Moreover, the increase in neu-
rons encoding self-decisions indicates that the drop in other-
predictive neurons was not simply due to a difference in the
raw number of overall cooperation/defection trials. Therefore,
this considerable reduction in the fraction of other-predictive
neurons indicates that other-predictive neurons are significantly
and selectively sensitive to social context.
Neurons Encoding the Other’s Unknown Decisions Do
Not Encode Expected Reward
While certain cingulate cells are known to encode received and
expected reward (Seo and Lee, 2007; Sheth et al., 2012;Williams
and Eskandar, 2006), cells encoding self or other decisions were
largely distinct from those that encoded expected reward. An
important feature of the iPD game is that it enables one to disso-
ciate neuronal signals encoding self and other decisions from
those related to expected reward. Specifically, the monkey’s
own choice alone cannot guarantee a high or low reward.
Therefore, predicting one’s own reward inherently requires an
accurate prediction of the opponent’s yet unknown selection.
Nonetheless, to demonstrate more directly that the activity of
cells predicting other-decisions is not explained by encoding
of expected reward, we provide four lines of evidence based
on examining the neuronal responses across multiple behavioral
outcome contingencies.
First, we directly examined the encoding of expected reward
during the decision period. We found that none of the other-pre-
dictive neurons was significantly modulated by self-reward
across all four reward contingencies determined by the payoff
matrix (see Supplemental Information for statistical tests). Sec-
ond, we examined the differences in firing rate modulation be-
tween encoding of other decision and encoding of self-reward
across the recorded population. We found that the firing rate
modulation of other-predictive neurons was strong and signifi-
cantly different from the general population when considering
differences in the other’s choice to cooperate or defect (Fig-
ure 4A), but not when aligning trials according to differences in
the monkey’s own expected reward, i.e., comparing trials in
which the monkey cooperated or defected when the other
choose to defect (Figure 4B) and when the other chose to coop-
erate (Figure 4C). Note that while we did find neurons in the
dACC that showed strong modulation to self and other reward
(as previously reported by Azzi et al., 2012; Chang et al., 2013;
Hosokawa and Watanabe, 2012), these were distinct from the
other-predictive neurons (Figure S7A; Supplemental Informa-
tion). Third, we examined the reward feedback period itself, as
it may have been possible that other-predictive neurons only
encode reward weakly during the decision period when outcome1238 Cell 160, 1233–1245, March 12, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.is uncertain, but are more strongly modulated by reward when
it is certain or known. However, we found that this was not the
case (Figure 4D). In fact, compared to other cingulate cells,
which overall demonstrated an enhanced modulation to ex-
pected reward during feedback, other-predictive neurons
demonstrated a slight, non-significant reduction in modulation
(Figure 4E). Finally, to test whether other-predictive neurons
could be simply sensitive to raw difference in amount of reward
irrespective of choice, we repeat the comparison between feed-
back time modulation and decision time modulation, but for the
contingency that yielded the maximal difference in reward, and
find no difference in modulation of the other-predictive neurons
(Figure 4F).
In summary, we demonstrate that the response properties of
other-predictive neurons were not explained by simple encoding
of the monkey’s own expected reward (see Supplemental Infor-
mation). These results are further bolstered by the finding above
that other-predictive neurons encoded no significant information
about self-decisions and that they were highly sensitive to social
context compared to other population cells.
dACC Populations Accurately Predict the Other’s
Decisions on a Trial-by-Trial Basis
Activity in the dACC was significantly predictive of self and
other’s choices on a trial-by-trial basis when considered across
the entire population (Figures 5A and 5B). We constructed a
linear decoder to predict the monkeys selections based on pop-
ulation activity (see Supplemental Information). Evaluatingmodel
performance on validation trials not used for model training, we
find that cingulate populations predicted up to 66.1% ± 0.9%
of the recorded monkey’s own current choices (multivariance
analysis of variance [MANOVA], p < 104), with predictions being
most pronounced in the pre-selection period (Figure 5C).
Surprisingly, population activity correctly predicted the other
monkey’s yet unknown choices on up to 79.4 ± 1.1% of trials
(MANOVA, p < 105), with predictions being most pronounced
in the post-selection period (Figure 5D). Prediction of other’s un-
known choices was significantly more accurate than prediction
of monkey’s own current choices (paired t test, p < 105).
To more directly examine the role that the cells selected as
other-predictive neurons by the regression analysis play in pop-
ulation decoding of the other’s yet unknown decision, we next
ran the decoder using only this subset of the neuronal popula-
tion. We find that the accuracy of predicting the other monkey’s
decision was not affected and remained up to 78.1% ± 0.8%
(MANOVA, p < 109) correct, despite the fact that the decoder
had access to far less cells. However, the accuracy of decoding
the monkey’s own decisions drastically dropped and was only
up to 54.7% ± 0.9% (MANOVA, p = 0.37, n.s.). These specific ef-
fects found in restricting the analysis to this subset of neurons
further support the above ascribed role of other-predictive neu-
rons, aswell as the functional distinction between these cells and
those that encode the monkey’s own selections.
Finally, we considered whether implicit cues between the two
monkeys could explain these predictions. Note that an important
aspect of the task design was that the monkeys made their se-
lections in random temporal order before their responses were
revealed. Accordingly, we tested the population predictions
Figure 4. Other-Predictive Neurons Do Not Encode the Monkey’s Own Expected Reward as Shown across Multiple Reward Contingencies
(A) Histogram of normalized difference in firing rate between trials in which the other monkey defected versus cooperated. Red bars indicate other-predictive
neurons. Blue bars indicate the full population. The distributions were statistically different.
(B) Histogram of normalized difference in firing rate between trials in which the monkey chose defection versus cooperation, conditioned on the other choosing
defection. Red bars indicate other-predictive neurons. Blue bars indicate the full population. No significant difference was found between distributions.
(C) Histogram of normalized difference in firing rate between trials in which the monkey chose defection versus cooperation, conditioned on the other choosing
cooperation. Red bars indicate other-predictive neurons. Blue bars indicate full population. No significant difference was found between distributions.
(D) Scatter plot of firing rate difference between trials in which the other defected versus cooperated, for firing rate during decision time (x axis) and feedback time
(y axis) in other-predictive neurons. There is no increase in differential activity when reward is known. Crosses represent mean ± SEM.
(E) Scatter plot of firing rate difference between trials in which other defected versus cooperated, for firing rate during decision time (x axis) and feedback time
(y axis) in the full population. Here, there was a significant increase in differential activity when reward is known.
(F) Scatter plot of firing rate difference between trials in which the monkey chose defection versus cooperation, conditioned on other’s defection, for firing rate
during decision time (x axis) and feedback time (y axis) in other-predictive neurons. Here, there is no increase in differential activity when reward is known.
See also Figure S7.when considering only trials in which the monkey played first,
i.e., when the other monkey hadn’t yet made his selection. We
found that predictions of other’s unknown choices maintained
high accuracy (up to 70.7% ± 0.8%) and similar accuracies
were found when considering only trials in which the monkey
played second (68.5% ± 7.2%), ruling out the possibility that pre-
diction is an artifact of an implicit signal disclosing the othermon-
key’s choice. Note lower accuracy was expected due to using
half the number of trials.
Behavioral Trial-by-Trial Decoders
To search for a possible basis for neural prediction of the other’s
concurrent selections, we examined predictions based on both
monkeys’ prior behavioral history. Using a locally-optimal classi-
fication model considering the monkeys’ selections four trials
back, we estimated on validation trial data the accuracy of pre-
dicting the opponent monkey’s unknown concurrent choices.
We find that model prediction accuracy was up to 79.8%, similar
to neuronal decoding (similar accuracies were found for predict-
ing self-selections, see Supplemental Information). To further
explore the behavioral basis of the neuronal predictions ofother’s decisions, we tested trial-by-trial correlation between
the behavioral and population-activity predictors, revealing sig-
nificant correlations based on both monkeys’ past selections
(r = 0.31, p < 0.0003). These correlations of other’s predictions
were not evident when behavioral predictions were based on
only a single monkey’s past decisions or reward (see Supple-
mental Information). This suggests that population predictions
were based on the prior choices of the two monkeys rather
than any individual’s past response or reward.
Neurons Keeping Track of Past Interactions
Consistent with the above findings, we find that many neurons
within the population kept a dynamic record of the monkeys’
prior selections. Figure 5E illustrates such a neuron; when the
monkey chose to currently defect (left panel), responses did
not differ when, on the preceding trial, the opponent chose to
defect versus cooperate. In contrast, when the monkey himself
cooperated (right panel), neuronal activity was significantly in-
hibited on trials in which the opponent previously defected
(i.e., the monkey cooperated despite the opponent previously
defecting) compared to those in which the opponent cooperatedCell 160, 1233–1245, March 12, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1239
Figure 5. Trial-by-Trial Population Prediction of the Other’s Yet Unknown Decision
(A and B) Principal component (PC) analysis over a sample session. Plotted in first three PC space, each circle represents the activity of all neurons recorded
simultaneously on a single cooperation (red) or defection (blue) trial (see Supplemental Information).
(A) Self-current pre-decision activity.
(B) Other’s-concurrent (yet unknown) post-decision activity.
(C and D) Linear decoding model. Each bar represents projection of the activity of all simultaneously recorded neurons during a single trial on first discriminant
component (color code above). Positive values predict cooperation and negative defection. Insets (top right) plot distribution of projection values for cooperation
(red) and defection (blue).
(C) Self-current pre-selection projection.
(D) Other’s-concurrent projection during post-selection.
(legend continued on next page)
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Figure 6. dACC Stimulation Selectively Inhibits Mutually Beneficial
Interactions
White bars represent stimulation trials.
(A) Proportion in which the monkeys chose cooperation over defection ± SEM
(decision-ratio of 1 indicates equal proportion of selecting either).
(B) Decision-ratio given the opponent’s past decisions to cooperate (left), or
defect (right).(i.e., reciprocating opponent’s preceding cooperation). In addi-
tion we found neurons that differentially encoded the joint out-
comes on preceding trials (see Figure S7B and Supplemental
Information for further details).
Cingulate Disruption Selectively Inhibits Mutually
Beneficial Interactions
Given the above physiological findings, we next investigated
whether disruption of the dACC may influence the monkeys’
mutual choices. A series of electrical pulses was delivered to
the dACC on half of 3,026 randomly selected trials in blocks
(1,000 ms triggered at image presentation; 100 mA, 200-ms
biphasic pulse durations with cathodal phase leading; see
Supplemental Information).
Stimulation had a significant and selective effect on the mon-
keys’ decisions. Here, we defined the ‘‘decision-ratio’’ as the
number of trials in which the monkey selected cooperation
over defection (i.e., a ratio of 1 indicates equal selection of coop-
eration versus defection). When no stimulation was given, the
decision-ratio was 0.53 (corresponding to 34.7% cooperation,
as also found in the main task). When stimulation was adminis-
tered, the decision-ratio dropped to 0.43, i.e., monkeys were
less likely to cooperate when stimulated (t(6) = 3.18, p < 0.01)(E) Peristimulus histograms as mean firing activity ± SEM (top) and raster plots of
period and modulated by the other’s past decision. Trials separated according
ponent’s decision on a preceding trial to cooperate (red) or defect (blue; see te
period.(Figure 6A). This effect was highly dependent on the opponent
monkey’s preceding selection. When the opponent previously
cooperated and no stimulation was given, the decision-ratio
was 0.74, meaning that monkeys were more likely to choose
cooperation if the opponent previously chose cooperation. How-
ever, during stimulation, following opponent’s cooperation, the
decision-ratio significantly dropped to 0.43 (t(6) = 5.57, p <
0.0007) (Figure 6B). In contrast, following opponent’s defection
when no stimulation was given, the decision ratio was 0.48
and, when stimulation was given, it was 0.43 (t(6) = 1.12, p =
0.15). In other words, stimulation had no effect on the monkey’s
current decision if the opponent previously defected, but when
the opponent previously cooperated, stimulation reduced the
decision-ratio to a level equal to the opponent previously
choosing defection. Moreover, stimulation had no effect on risk
behavior since the rate of cooperation when the other monkey
defected on the preceding trial was not affected by stimulation
(even though the risk of cooperation under such a condition is
higher; i.e., the probability of the opponent to defect following
defection is twice higher than following cooperation).
Finally, to further confirm that stimulation did not simply affect
decisions based on past reward, we employed a zero-sum game
task in which monkey’s reward was contingent on the other’s
response, but individual profit was always at the expense of
the other and no mutual positive outcome was possible (i.e.,
playing under Pareto optimality conditions) (Nash, 1950). We
found no effect of stimulation on monkeys’ choices during
the zero-sum game, based either on themonkeys’ preceding se-
lection or preceding receipt of reward (Figure 7; Supplemental
Information). Taken together, we conclude that stimulation in
the dACC abolished specifically the incorporation of recent pos-
itive interactions, rather than any past interaction, into the mon-
key’s own current decision, resulting in less mutually beneficial
interactions.
DISCUSSION
Identifying neurons that reflect another individual’s covert inten-
tions or ‘‘state of mind’’ has been a long sought goal in neurosci-
ence and a central proposed tenet of social decision making
(Frith and Frith, 1999; Rilling et al., 2004; Sanfey et al., 2006;
Vogeley et al., 2001). Here, we discover neurons that selectively
encode another individual’s yet unknown decisions during joint
interactions.We confirmed that no explicit cueswere relayed be-
tween the twomonkeys during the task by using alternating trials
in half of which the monkey from which we obtained recordings
played first. We also demonstrated reliable population predic-
tions of the other’s decisions even on trials in which the other
monkey had not yet made his selection. Remarkably, other-pre-
dictive cells during joint interactions constituted over a third of
the cingulate task-responsive population and were more preva-
lent than cells encoding the monkey’s own present selections.
Notably, other predictive neurons were highly sensitive to sociala neuron encoding the monkey’s own current decision during the pre-selection
to monkey’s own current decision to defect (left) or cooperate (right) and op-
xt). Time zero denotes monkey’s own selection. Gray bar indicates feedback
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Figure 7. Stimulation Has No Effect when No Mutually Beneficial
Interactions Were Possible
(A) Zero-sum game payoff matrix.
(B–D) Bars represent the decision-ratio on stimulated (white) and non-stimu-
lated (colored) trials during the zero-sum game (see Supplemental Informa-
tion). Error bars represent SEM. (B) Overall decision-ratio. (C) Decision-ratio
was not affected by opponent’s selection of choice A (left) or choice B (right) on
the preceding trial. (D) Decision-ratio was not affected by the monkey’s own
past reward. Left bars: the monkey previously received a high reward. Right
bars: the monkey previously received a low reward.context and were not modulated by self-decisions or expected
reward. Consistently, population predictions of the opponent’s
selections were more accurate than those reflecting the mon-
key’s own selections and, in fact, predicted the other monkey’s
decisions with accuracies that were near optimal compared to
behavioral decoders that considered bothmonkey’s past behav-
iors. Taken together, these findings provide understanding of the
population partitioning by which individual neurons in the pri-1242 Cell 160, 1233–1245, March 12, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.mate cingulate cortex encode information about other social
agents.
Game theory provides a framework for dissecting specific
aspects of joint decision making, namely the contributions of
self and other choices to shared outcome. Signals related to
another’s yet unobservable actions, in particular, are a distinct
feature ofmutual interactions in that one participant’s concurrent
decision affects the other’s outcome and therefore inherently
requires each participant to anticipate the other’s intentions or
state of mind.
These predictive signals are fundamentally distinct from previ-
ously reported neurons which reflect another animal’s known
and observable actions. These include canonical mirror neurons
that reflect one’s observed behavior and do not distinguish
between self and other (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia, 2010), neurons that encode another’s observed
receipt of reward (Azzi et al., 2012; Chang et al., 2013), and neu-
rons that monitor other’s observable errors (Yoshida et al., 2012).
Importantly, the prediction neurons reported here are distinct
from the findings of the latter study, in which neurons monitored
the other’s errors while the monkeys explicitly observed each
other’s selections on the same shared task (with each monkey
alternating between actor and observer every other trial)
(Yoshida et al., 2012). Moreover, encoding of the other’s
error occurred within the monkeys’ movement time window
(<200 ms before other’s response) and in a setup which allowed
them to directly observe each other’s movement-preparatory
cues. Here, decisions were made jointly, the other’s decisions
were inherently unobservable and unknown, and their neural en-
coding could be found many seconds before the other monkey
made a selection.
A central feature of non-competitive games such as iPD is
that no particular decision guarantees a high or low reward
and different outcomes can be experienced either mutually or
individually. This dissociation enabled us to examine the compu-
tations that contributed to self and other predictions and differ-
entiate them from those that contribute to the encoding of
reward outcome. More importantly, it allowed us to examine
what particular computations were associated with interactions
that were mutually beneficial compared with those that were not.
For instance, the monkeys were almost twice as likely to coop-
erate if they both cooperated on the preceding trial, indicating
an intention to reciprocate mutual cooperation. Here, we find
that neurons that encoded a monkey’s decisions largely did
not encode his past or future receipt of reward even though, in
combination, these neural signals could be used to predict the
monkey’s shared outcome. Many neurons, however, were also
highly modulated by the two monkey’s prior selections. For
example, certain neurons differentially encoded the monkey’s
present decision to cooperate, based on the other monkey’s
preceding selection of cooperation or defection. Similarly, at
the population level, neuronal predictions strongly correlated
with predictions made by the behavioral decoder when con-
sidering both monkeys’ past selections, indicating that neural
predictions were based on the past interaction of both
individuals.
Consistent with these physiological findings, we observed that
disruption of the dACC by stimulation reduced the monkey’s
likelihood of cooperation, an effect which was most evident
when the opponent cooperated on the preceding trial. Stimula-
tion therefore affected reciprocation of the other’s cooperation,
but did not affect the animal’s ability to incorporate any past de-
cision or outcome since no effect was observed when the oppo-
nent defected on the previous trial, or when testing themonkey’s
decisions in a zero-sum game. This is consistent with previous
studies employing a computer opponent in zero-sum games
that showed that the dACC does not differentially encode the
monkey’s decisions during such interactions (Donahue et al.,
2013; Seo and Lee, 2007). Therefore, during joint interactions,
the dACC specifically mediated mutually beneficial decisions
based on the recent history of the interaction.
The monkeys were clearly affected by the social context of
their interaction, as they significantly changed their behavior
when playing either against a computer opponent or in separate
rooms, consistent with prior reports (Carter et al., 2012; Chang
et al., 2013; Hosokawa and Watanabe, 2012). Moreover, other-
predictive neurons were selectively influenced by social context
compared other population cells, suggesting that these cells en-
coded information that was specific to other social agents rather
than any information about the environment which affected
outcome. The monkeys also selected the appropriate responses
when their opponent’s decisions were known, suggesting that
they understood the consequent payoff. While the joint nature
of the task precludes the possibility of identifying ‘‘involuntary er-
rors’’ by the individual animals, we find that the monkeys made
incorrect selections on <10% of sequential control trials making
such rare occurrences highly unlikely to qualitatively affect the
study’s results. This conclusion is also supported by the finding
that the population prediction of the opponent’s decisions was
robust to substantial deletion of trials. However, as with any an-
imal or human study that investigates interactive behavior, what
internal thought process truly motivates these different behav-
iors can only be speculated upon. On this point, we note that
cooperation is based on the observable action of two interacting
individuals, rather than its hidden motivation, and is defined
explicitly as the selection of actions capable of leading to joint
benefit but which can also lead to loss if the action is not mutual.
Taken together, the present findings support the proposed
role of the dACC in encoding a dynamic model of the environ-
ment (Adolphs, 2009; Karlsson et al., 2012; Sheth et al., 2012)
but considerably expand it into the inclusion of mutual interac-
tions which require an explicit representation of another’s yet un-
known behavior. The two distinct groups of neurons found in the
dACC, encoding the self versus predicting the other’s decisions,
may therefore be uniquely suitable to allow the soon-available
actual decision of the opponent and known decision of the acting
monkey to update the internal model of their joint decisions in a
way analogous to delta-learning (Pouget and Snyder, 2000) or an
actor-critic (Parush et al., 2011; Williams and Eskandar, 2006;
Witten, 1977) framework. Given the broad anatomical connectiv-
ity of the dACC to areas that encode aspects of socially-guided
interactions, including the temporal-parietal junction, superior
temporal sulcus, amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex, the dACC
is likely to be part of a wider network of areas, sometimes
referred to as the ‘‘social brain.’’ The observed role of the
dACC in predicting another’s intentions contributes to our under-standing of this proposed network. For instance, disruption of its
activity markedly degraded cooperative behavior, suggesting
that dACC activity may be necessary for constructive interaction
between individuals and social learning. Such deficits are partic-
ularly prominent in individuals with autism-spectrum disorders or
antisocial behavior in which anticipating another’s intentions or
state of mind and incorporating them into one’s actions are
severely affected (Frith and Frith, 1999; Lombardo and Baron-
Cohen, 2011). Our neuronal findings in combination with the
behavioral effects observed with stimulation may therefore
pave the way toward targeted treatment in the dACC for these
or similar disorders in which dysfunctional social behavior is a
predominant feature.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Task Design
Four adult male Rhesus monkeys (Macaca Mulatta) across four paired combi-
nations were trained to play an iterated prisoner’s dilemma (iPD) game. On
successive trials, two images (an orange hexagon and a blue triangle) were
randomly displayed on the left and right of the screen (Figure 1A). Each mon-
key selected one of the two images using a joystick and was not shown the
other monkey’s concurrent selection. The outcome of each monkey’s selec-
tion depended on both of their concurrent choices, according to the payoff
matrix shown in Figure 1B. Based on these payoffs, the orange hexagon
was operationally defined as ‘‘cooperation’’ since mutual cooperation led to
the highest mutual reward (Camerer, 2003). The blue triangle was operationally
defined as ‘‘defection’’ since unilateral defection led to the highest individual
reward. However, if both monkeys defected, they each received less reward
than if they both cooperated. Note, importantly, that the terms cooperation
and defection are used here solely to indicate the potential for mutual benefit
or loss dependent on the opponent’s selection. Mutual cooperation and
mutual defection indicates that both monkeys made the same choice. See
Supplemental Information for trial structure details.
Neuronal Recording and Stimulation
Single-Unit Isolation and Recordings
All procedures were performed under approval by the Massachusetts General
Hospital institutional review board and were conducted in accordance with
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) guidelines. Prior to re-
cordings, floating micro-electrode arrays (MicroProbes for Life Sciences)
were surgically implanted in each monkey. The electrodes were implanted in
the dACC through a wide craniotomy under stereotactic guidance (David
Kopf Instruments). The location of the arrays was confirmed by direct visual in-
spection of the sulcal and gyral anatomy with the electrode tips located 8 mm
from the cortical surface. Each array had 36 microelectrodes spaced horizon-
tally 400 mm apart. Electrode leads were secured to the skull and attached to
connectors with the aid of titanium miniscrews and dental acrylic.
Recordings began 2 weeks following surgical recovery. A Plexon multi-
channel acquisition processor was used to amplify and band-pass filter
the neuronal signals (150 Hz–8 kHz; 1 pole low-cut and 3 pole high-cut with
1,0003 gain; Plexon). Shielded cabling carried the signals from the electrode
array to a set of six 16-channel amplifiers. Neural signals were then digitized at
40 kHz and processed to extract action potentials by the Plexon workstation.
Classification of the waveforms was performed using template matching and
principal component analysis based on waveform parameters. Only single-,
well-isolated units with identifiable waveform shapes and adequate refractory
periods were used. When an individual electrode recorded more than one
neuron, a high degree of isolation was required in order to include each as a
single-unit (p < 0.01, multivariate ANOVA across the 1+ two principal compo-
nents). We did not include multi-unit activity.
Electrical Stimulation Protocol
During stimulation trials, the monkeys performed the iPD and zero-sum games
in separate sessions. Each session was composed of randomly selectedCell 160, 1233–1245, March 12, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1243
30–40 stimulated trials followed by another 30–40 trials in which no stimulation
was delivered. Stimulation was administered as a brief series of alternating
rectangular positive to negative voltage pulses. Stimulation parameters were
100 mA and 200 Hz biphasic pulses, with cathodal phase leading. Average
impedance at the time of the stimulation experiments was 100–500 kU.
Here, all 32 electrode contacts were simultaneously stimulated per array.
Stimulation was given for 1,000 ms and included the baseline and image pre-
sentation periods. Stimulation ended prior to presentation of the go cue and
prior to the monkey’s selection.
Statistical Analysis
A stepwise linear regression was conducted in order to determine how the
different task parameters modulated the neuronal activity. In this analysis, pa-
rameters are incrementally added to the model, starting with the parameter
that explains the most variance and continuing on to the parameters that
most explain the remaining variance, terminating when parameters no longer
significantly explain the residual variance. The model included the four main
effect parameters, as described below (self-current, other-current, self-past
and other-past) as well as their pairwise interactions (see Equation 1),
rðtÞ= a+
X4
i = 1
bMaini M
Main
i +
X6
i = 1
bInteri M
Inter
i (Equation 1)
where r(t) is current trial firing rate,MMain = fsðtÞ; sðt 1Þ;oðtÞ;oðt 1Þg are the
four main effects and MInter = fsðtÞsðt 1Þ; sðtÞoðtÞ; sðtÞoðt 1Þ; sðt 1ÞoðtÞ;
sðt 1Þoðt 1Þ;oðtÞoðt 1Þg are the six second order interaction terms; s(t)
is current self selection, o(t) is current other selection, and (t 1) indicates pre-
ceding trial.
For brevity, ‘‘self’’ refers here to the selections of the monkey in which neural
recordings were performed and ‘‘other’’ refers to the selections of the oppo-
nent (i.e., selecting to cooperate or defect). In addition, ‘‘current’’ refers to
the two monkeys’ current selection (i.e., the trial from which neuronal activity
was being evaluated) and ‘‘past’’ refers to the two monkeys’ selections on
the previous trial. The depended variable is the averaged neuronal firing in
the 500 ms period before response selection (i.e., choosing cooperation
versus defection) and during the 500 ms period after selection, referred to as
‘‘pre-selection’’ and ‘‘post-selection,’’ respectively. Note that we chose to
use a stepwise linear regression this analysis since the task parameters and
samples were neither balanced nor independent (see further details in Supple-
mental Information). Multiple complimentary analyses, including a four-way
analysis of variance, AIC analysis, and mixture of regressions analysis, yielded
qualitatively similar results.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Extended Experimental Procedures, seven
figures, and three tables and can be found with this article online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.cell.2015.01.045.
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